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Schupak: Women in Prison

COMMENTS
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE UNIQUE
NEEDS OF WOMEN IN PRISON
1.

INTRODUCTION
In spite of the clear constitutional requirement that prisons and jails provide adequate
medical care for prisoners, the poor quality of
medical care is one of the most critical penological problems today. This is particularly true, and
particularly consequential, with respect to the
care provided to many pregnant women
prisoners. 1

The inherent restrictions of the prison environment prevent
incarcerated women from meeting their own medical needs. 2 As
a result, inmates are completely dependent upon prison staff to
respond to their medical demands3 and unless proper medical
care is provided, it will not be received. 4
Comprehensive prenatal care is vital to a successful pregnancy. Quality care begins with a thorough physical examination. 5 At that time, the physician administers tests, 6 compiles
1. Barry, Quality of Prenatal Care for Incarcerated Women Challenged, 6 YOUTH
LAW NEWS 1 (Nov.·Dec. 1985).
2. The district court in Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977), pointed out that because a prisoner's freedom is so restricted, he
or she cannot treat even a minor ailment. Id. at 1133.
3. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1133.
4. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
5. Cal. Dept. of Health Services, STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC
PRENATAL CARE 7 (1984) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]. The purpose of this manual
has been described by the department as follows: "This manual has been developed as a
guide for public prenatal programs. It is based on present standards for obstetrical and
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the woman's medical background and assesses her needs.' She is
also instructed on the importance of proper nutritionS for her
own health and the health of the fetus. 9 To continually monitor
her health during the pregnancy, a woman should have regular
examinations throughout the duration. 1o
Prisons, however, commonly provide inadequate prenatal
care.l l Pregnancies are handled individually and sporadically
rather than systematically,12 and often both the mother and
child suffer. In addition, the mother and child are separated
shortly after birth13 which may adversely affect the mother-child
gynecological services of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology and for
public health practice of the American Public Health Association." [d. The standards in
this manual will be used herein as guidelines for minimally acceptable standards of prenatal care, because they "incorporate minimal standards set and observed nationally for
perinatal services." McCall, Casteel & Shaw, PREGNANCY IN PRISON: A NEEDS ASSESSMENT
OF PERINATAL OUTCOME IN THREE CALIFORNIA PENAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (1985) (a report to
the State of California Department of Health Services) [hereinafter cited PREGNANCY IN
PRISON].
6. STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 10. The tests are administered to determine any possible complications or risks the mother may encounter. [d. The tests given should include blood, urine, syphilis, rubella antibody titer, Rh, antibody screen, PAP, gonorrhea,
TB, sickle cell (as indicated), and glucose and sonogram as may be needed. PREGNANCY
IN PRISON, supra note 5, at 20.
7. A thorough needs and background assessment should include psychosocial, family
medical, personal medical, obstetric and nutritional, and a determination of the individual's knowledge of her condition. STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 8.
8. Adequate intake of nutrients is important for fetal growth and the continued
health of the mother. [d. at 14.
Since pregnancy is a time of growth and formulation of new
life, it is a time when the nutrient stores of the mother need to
be maintained to supply food across the placenta to the fetus.
The amino acids from the protein food consumed by the
mother are used by the fetus for synthesis and tissue building.
Large amounts of iron are needed in addition to protein, to
aid in synthesis of hemoglobin in the red blood cells, and carrying of oxygen from the lungs to the tissues.
[d. at 27 app. A.
9. [d. at 14. "Poor diets during pregnancy and poor nutritional status of the mother
prior to pregnancy have been documented to be associated with higher incidence of low
birth weight babies and increased infant mortality and morbidity." [d.
10. At a minimum, a pregnant woman should see a doctor once monthly during the
first 28 weeks, twice monthly between 28 and 36 weeks, and once weekly thereafter. [d.
at 13.
11. Barry, supra note 1, at 2; McHugh, Protection of the Rights of Pregnant
Women in Prisons and Detention Facilities, 6 NEW ENG. J. PRISON LAW 231, 239 (1980).
12. McHugh, supra note 11, at 232.
13. In general, the mother is separated from her child within 48 hours after birth.
Interview with Ellen Barry, Director of Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, San
Francisco, California (August 1985) [hereinafter cited as Aug. Interview].
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relationship. 14
This Comment will examine the deficiencies of the prison
prenatal care system. It will discuss current litigation in terms of
its impact on the prison staff to effectuate change and its possible influence upon future litigation. Further, three states' models for permitting the retention of physical custody of a child by
an incarcerated mother will be investigated.
II. MEDICAL CARE

A.

LITIGATION

Historically; courts have approached prison litigation cautiously.lll Change, because it required expert planning and coordination, was better left to the legislature and the executive. 16
The courts intervened only if constitutional rights were being violated. 17 Today, in the medical care context, court intervention
results when a prison medical care system is challenged as violative of the eighth amendmentl8 of the United States Constitution. 19 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted."20 Punishment that involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"21 is a manifest violation of
the eighth amendment. 22
14. RICHARDS, Effects on Development of Medical Interventions and Separation of
Newborns from their Parents, in THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE ... PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY EXPERIENCE 49 (1979).
15. E.g., Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1977).
16. ld. at 1132 (citing Priser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490-92, 93 (1973». The
district court in Todaro stated "The problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree." ld. (citing Procunier v. Martines, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974».
17. E.g., Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1132; Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 280
(M.D. 1972). The district court in Newman added, "Courts should not inquire into the
adequacy or sufficiency of medical care of state prison inmates unless there appears to be
an abuse of the broad discretion which prison officials possess in this area." ld., at 278.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VITI.
19. Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1132. "It cannot now be doubted that denial of medical
care to a state prisoner constitutes a violation of the eighth amendment •..." ld. See
also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, made applicable to the states by U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
22. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976).
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The United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble,23
established the standard under which an inmate may challenge a
prison medical care system as constitutionally inadequate in violation of the eighth amendment. 24 In Estelle,25 an inmate of the
Texas Department of Corrections instituted a federal civil rights
action,26 alleging he received inadequate medical attention for a
back injury he sustained while performing a prison work assignment. 27 The Supreme Court held: "In order to state a cognizable
claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs."28 The Court stated that deliberate indifference results
when prison doctors or prison staff intentionally deny access to
medical care or when prescribed care is intentionally interfered
with or not delivered. 29 Utilizing the "deliberate indifference"
standard, the Court found that respondent's injury had been adequately treated, and that the decision not to x-ray the injury
may, at most, have been medical malpractice. 30 His claim was
accordingly denied. 31
Two important principles result from the Supreme Court's
decision in Estelle v. Gamble. 32 First, the Court recognized that
certain punishments are incompatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci23. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
24. Id. at 104-05.
25.Id.
26. Section 1983 of Title 42 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Colombia, subjects or causes to be subjected, as citizen
of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and Laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
27. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
28. Id. at 106. The Court stated: "We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain' proscribed by the eighth amendment." Id. at 104.
29. Id. at 104-05.
30. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court said that neither inadvertant failure to provide
adequate medical care, nor mere negligence meet the standard of deliberate indifference
and hence there is no violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 105.
3!. Id. at 108.
32. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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ety,"33 and acknowledged the government's affirmative obligation to provide medical care to those it imprisons.34 Second, the
implication of Estelle was that subsequent cases challenging the
constitutionality of a prison medical care system must be analyzed using the "deliberate indifference" standard. 35
Litigation by women inmates is scare, in part because
women are less litigious than men.3S Todaro v. Ward 37 was the
first suit brought by women challenging the adequacy of medical
care delivered at a women's prison. The plaintiffs38 alleged that
the delivery of medical care at the Bedford Hills facility39 in
New York violated their rights under the eighth amendment of
the United States Constitution.40 This case presented an institution-wide challenge to the medical care system operating at Bedford Hills.41 Using the "deliberate indifference" standard, the
court held the medical practices at Bedford Hills "constitutionally infirm."42 The court found that the use of the lobby clinic, a
screening device whereby a nurse was appointed to screen inmate complaints and schedule doctor's appointments, caused serious delays in access to a physician.43 The court also found that
poor record-keeping and inadequate notice procedures routinely
33. [d. at 102 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958».
34. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
35. Barry, supra note 1, at 1.
36. GABLE, LEGAL ISSUES OF FEMALE INMATES (1982) (a report prepared by the
School for Social Work at Smith College). The study was conducted to determine if
women are less litigious than men. The study concluded "it is not a lack of concern that
limits activism, but a lack of resources stemming from the crinIinal justice system's failure to properly assess the needs of women in prison. Its consequent failure to provide
resources relative to inmates' real needs creates passivity and feeds continued administrative neglect." [d. at 207.
37. 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aU'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977).
38. Plaintiffs represent a class "consisting of all persons who are or will be confined
at Bedford Hills." Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1131.
39. Bedford Hills is a medium security facility housing female prisoners in the custody of the New York Department of Corrections. Todaro, 565 F.2d at 50.
40. Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1131.
41. This case did not involve an individual claim for relief, rather it raised the issue
of when individual failures "in the overall operation of a prison medical care system add
up to deliberate indifference which would render the entire system unconstitutional?"
[d. at 1133.
42. Todaro, 565 F.2d at 52-53.
43. [d. at 51. The circuit court stated: "The effects of the screening procedure were,
on occasion, devastating. Analysis of the medical records in evidence and the testimony
of five inmate witnesses revealed that delays of two weeks to two months in achieving
access to a physician were not uncommon." [d.
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impeded scheduling physician ordered follow-up care.44
The defendants45 in Todaro argued that the district court's
findings were based on a few isolated incidents.46 The court of
appeals rejected this contention, recognizing that the plaintiffs
had evidence of many instances in which access to care was
delayed or denied,47 and that any limit in the number of examples was attributable to the court ordered discovery limitations. 48 The defendants also asserted that the procedures used at
Bedford Hills were comparable to those used at other correctional institutions.49 In response, the court said, "[T]his court
has repeatedly rejected the argument that institutional practices
must be defective in the maximum degree before a violation of
constitutional rights can be found and corrected."50

Todaro v. Ward 51 illustrated what procedures may be constitutionally inadequate. 52 In refining the definition of "deliberate indifference," the court indicated that whenever use of a
screening procedure seriously delays access to care,53 and poor
record keeping results in deficient follow-up care, a constitutional violation exists, provided plaintiffs show more than iso44. Id. at 52. The court found that the delays were often several months. Id.
45. Named as defendants were Benjamin Ward, Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections; Ian Loudon, Assistant Commissioner for Health Services of the
New York State Department of Correctional Services; David Frost, Southern Regional
Director of Health Services of the New York State Department of Correctional Services;
Frances Clement, Superintendent of Bedford Hills; Henry Williams, Health Services Director of Bedford Hills; Robert Tschorn, Surgical Consultant at Bedford Hills and Marie
Daly, Nurse Administrator at Bedford Hills. Id. at 1129.
46. Todaro, 565 F.2d at 53.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 53 n.4. The court's discovery order was issued in "response to the state's
resistance to broader discovery." Id. The court stated, further, "[iJf the records introduced were atypical, the appellants were free to introduce others. This they failed to do."
Id.
49. Id. at 53.
50. Id.
5!. 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), afT'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. A constitutional violation was found in "the procedure devised to screen inmates' requests for medical assistance, to follow-up doctors' orders, and to observe patients confined to sick wing ...•" Todaro, 565 F.2d at 53.
53. Id. The procedures used at Bedford Hills are not uncommon. For example, in
California, the California Institution for Women (CIW), California Rehabilitation Center
(CRC) and Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center (Santa Rita) all use screening devices to
screen inmate complaints. See PREGNANCY IN PRISON supra note 5, at 146-47, 200, 251
(discussion of daily health care at CIW, CRC, and Santa Rita).
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lated incidences. 54 Todaro did not specifically address the
problems of pregnant women at Bedford Hills, but many of the
procedures found to violate the eighth amendment impact significantly upon pregnant women. 55
Subsequently, in West v. Manson,56 the care and treatment
of incarcerated pregnant women in prison was challenged specifically.57 This class action, filed on behalf of all female pretrial
and sentenced inmates at the Connecticut Correction Institution
at Niantic, challenged the conditions and policies of the institution. 58 Plaintiffs59 alleged, inter alia, that pregnant women were
provided no special diet. 6o They further alleged that the health
of pregnant women was jeopardized by being shackled during
transport for hospital visits,61 and from receiving inappropriate
drug treatment. 62

West v. Manson 63 was settled out of court.64 With respect to
pregnant inmates, the parties65 agreed that the standard inmate
54. The Todaro Court found that "while a single isolated instance of medical care
denied or delayed viewed in isolation may appear to be the product of mere negligence,
repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate indifference by prison authorities to the agony engendered by haphazard and ill conceived procedures." Todaro, 565
F.2d at 52.
55. A pregnant woman often requires emergency access to a physician, especially at
the onset of labor. In addition, it is important that she see a physician regularly throughout her pregnancy. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. If inIportant care is
denied or seriously delayed, the health of the mother and fetus may be jeopardized.
56. No. H83-366 (D. Conn. filed May 9, 1983).
57. Complaint at 1, West.
58. The suit was also filed on behalf of all children of Niantic inmates and challenged the adequacy of the facilities and services for inmate mothers and their children,
but their claims will not be discussed here. [d. at 1.
59. The class certified consisted of all women who were in or in the future would be
confined at Connecticut Correctional Institution at Niantic (CCIN) in pretrial or sentenced status, and all children whose mothers were or would be in the future confined at
. GCIN. Agreement of Settlement at 1, West.
60. Complaint at 9-10, West
61. [d. at 10. Defendants had recently changed their policy of shackling inmates
during labor and childbirth, but continued to shackle women going off the grounds for
hospital visits, and during hospital stays, including the post-partum period. [d.
62. [d.
63. No. H83-366 (D. Conn. filed May 9, 1983).
64. Agreement of Settlement at 1, West.
65. Defendants were: Manson, the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of
Corrections; Marie Cerino, the Warden of the Niantic facility and Mark Marcus, the
Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services. Complaint at 1, West.
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diet should be supplemented with extra milk and bran. 66 The
prison would make available any special dietary supplements.67
Also, the women would receive prenatal vitamins, and have access to prenatal classes. 6s Finally, the parties agreed that if a
pregnant woman had to be placed in leg irons, a nurse in the
medical unit must give approval. 69
This was a comprehensive settlement designed to meet the
unique needs of pregnant women.70 Since it was settled out of
court, it is unclear whether certain of defendants' practices violated the inmates' rights under the eighth amendment. The importance of the settlement is that is provides a good, comprehensive framework or set of guidelines to be followed by prison
systems that desire to change their present practices to accommop-ate the needs of pregnant inmates.

West left unresolved the issue of what practices in the treatment of pregnant inmates are so inadequate as to rise to the
level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."71
Harris v. McCarthy,72 which is currently being litigated, may
provide an answer. Harris is the first suit to challenge solely the
quality of prenatal and post-partum care given pregnant inmates. 73 The action was filed on behalf of all pregnant and postpartum women in the custody of the California Department of
Corrections.74 Plaintiffs75 alleged that defendants76 failed to con66. Pregnant inmates will receive the standard inmate menu at all meals with the
following additions: a) a serving of milk at each meal, b) an additional serving of milk at
non-meal time, c) bran will be provided on request absent supply problems, and nourishing snack food such as crackers, nuts, peanut butter, dried fruit, soup and granola bars
are to be kept in the commissary of the facility. Agreement of Settlement at 13-15, West.
67. The attending obstetrician will assess the dietary needs of each pregnant woman
as soon after confirmation of pregnancy as possible. Special needs will be marked in her
medical record, and any special diet prescribed will be made available. [d. at 15.
68. [d. at 14, 16.
69. [d. at 17.
70. According to Martha Stone, attorney for the plaintiffs in West v. Manson, the
officials at CCIN have been meeting their obligations under the settlement as it concerns
pregnant women. Telephone interview with Martha Stone, attorney with the Connecticut
Civil Liberties Union (January 10, 1986).
71. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
72. No. 85-6002 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 11, 1985).
73. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Harris [hereinafter
cited as Complaint].
74. [d.
75. The women named as plaintiffs were pregnant or had recently delivered, and
were incarcerated at the California Institution for Women (CIW) in Frontera, California.
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duct or permit regular medical examinations of incarcerated
pregnant women." Further, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants routinely failed to detect and respond to complications experienced during pregnancy or to the particular needs to high
risk pregnancies. 78 Among the other alleged infirm practices
were failure to respond to emergencies relating to pregnancy and
delivery,79 failure to provide adequate post-partum care, and
failure to provide appropriate medication and vitamins. 8o
The California Institution for Women (CIW) does not have
a doctor of obstetrics and gynecology on staff,81 nor does it have
the personnel or facilities to conduct adequate medical examinations or provide sufficient care.82 To help alleviate problems
caused by these deficiencies, CIW has contracted with Riverside
General Hospital (RGH) located approximately thirty miles
from the prison.83 Plaintiffs alleged, however, that defendants
continually failed to advise RGH staff of the status and number
of pregnant women,84 that defendants did not transport patients
to RGH for regular examinations, and that defendants canceled
examinations already scheduled by RGH medical staff.85 Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants failed to maintain adequate
medical records. 86 The sum of these allegations resulted in a
claim that defendants' actions constituted "deliberate indifference" to the serious medical needs of the inmates in violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Id.
76. Named as defendants were: Daniel McCarthy, Director of Corrections, California Department of Corrections; Anne Alexander, Acting Superintendent, CIW; Dr. K.K.
Srivastava, Chief Medical Officer, CIW. Id.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id. at 6-7.
79. Id. at 7. "Defendants' failure to provide adequate prenatal care to plaintiffs has
resulted in the death of at least one infant and the disability of a second infant. Defendants' failure to provide adequate medical care following delivery has caused at least one
plaintiff to have an unnecessary hysterectomy." Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id. "To care adequately for female patients, medical personnel must have special training in and sensitivity to womens' distinctive biological and physiological needs."
RESNIK & SHAW, Prisoners of Their Sex: Health Problems of Incarcerated Women, in 2
PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 326 (1980).
82. Complaint at 7, Harris.
83. Id. at 7. Inmates are transported to RGH for care. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 8.
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Constitution. 87 A settlement in Harris is likely,88 and should be
forthcoming.
B.

ANALYSIS

If Harris v. McCarthy 89 is litigated it will provide insight
into which practices concerning pregnant women are constitutionally inadequate. Certain of plaintiffs' allegations are similar
to the challenges raised in Todaro v. Ward,90 namely that the
ipmates are not receiving medical examinations and defendants
are not maintaining- adequate records. 9! These practices evidenced "deliberate indifference" to the inmates' medical needs
in Todaro,92 so if they exist at CIW, the defendants may be
forced to remedy such practices. If the parties agree to settle,
the resulting agreement may be similar to the settlement
reached in West. 93 The end result could be the elimination of
practices such as shackling pregnant inmates during transport to
the hospital,94 and providing nutritionally inadequate meals to
expectant mothers.911 In an effort to avoid litigation, prison officials may remedy their deficient medical procedures before they
are legally challenged. 96
87. Id. at 1.
88. Interview with Ellen Barry, Director of Legal Services for Prisoners With Children, in San Francisco, California. (January 7, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Jan. Interview]. According to Ms. Barry, the Harris litigation has sparked legislative interest in the
controversy surrounding the adequacy of prenatal care in California prisons. A bill was
introduced by Senator Presley that would provide for monitoring by the Maternal and
Child Health Board of the State Department of the standards of perinatal care. Id. See
S.B: 147, Cal. S. 147, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985) (amended by Sen. on Jan. 29, 1986) which
would add the following provision to the Health and Safety Code § 1267.10 (b): "The
Maternal and Child Health Board of the state department shall monitor and evaluate
the standards and protocols of perinatal care utilized by the state department for the
treatment of pregnant prisoners or inmates." Id.
89. No. 85-6002 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 11, 1985).
90. 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977).
91. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
92. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
93. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
94. It is common for states to handcuff and shackle inmates who are being transported outside the facility. The decision to shackle is a blanket rule, and hence is not
related to an individual's partiCUlar security needs. PREGNANCY IN PRISON, supra note 5,
at 214.
95. Prison diets tend to be high in starch and salt, and low in prenatal nutrients
such as iron and protein. McHugh, supra note 11, at 241.
96. Similar challenges were alleged in a recent action filed in Alameda County California. Jones v. Dyer, No. (Sup. Ct. Alameda County, filed Feb. 25, 1986). The action is
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III. PHYSICAL CUSTODY
Historically, incarcerated mothers retained custody of their
children inside the prison. 97 Prison administrators believed that
the presence of children had a rehabilitative effect on the
women. 98 Children aided the effort to socialize women into the
typically female roles of caretaker and homemaker.99 Modernly,
children are rarely permitted to remain with their incarcerated
mothers. In the overwhelming majority of states the new mother
is separated from her child within forty-eight hours after
birth.loo The mother returns to prison and the child must remain outside. lol This practice forces a woman to make alternative arrangements for the care of her child. lo2 Most often relatives care for the child. loS Occasionally, he or she stays with the
father lo• or is placed in foster care. lOIS Two states, however, currently have statutory provisions allowing a mother to retain
physical custody of her child after birth. lOB A third state had a
similar provision,I°7 which was later repealed. 108
brought by pregnant and post-partum women at Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center.
Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that defendants place the prisoners in leg irons during transport for hospital visits, and that the prison diet is nutritionally inadequate. Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Jones.
97. RESNIK & SHAW, supra note 81, at 321.

98. Id. at 322.
99.Id.
100. Aug. Interview, supra note 13.
101. Id.

102. See E. Barry & D. Lennon, Incarcerated Mothers and Their Children Current
Options and Possible Alternatives 12 (1977) (unpublished paper on file at Legal Services
for Prisoners With Children, San Francisco, California).
103. Approximately 75% of incarcerated mothers place their children with relatives.
PREGNANCY IN PRISON, supra note 5, at 91. The statistics used in the study are based on
inmates in California facilities, but the "data closely parallels that found in national
studies and profiles which have focused on the female offender." Id. at 59.
104. Another 12% stay with the father. Id. at 91.
105. About eight percent live with foster parents. Id.
106. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §611 (McKinney 1968); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3425
(West 1982).
107. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 121, § 22 (current version FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24 (West
1985».
108. 1981 Fla. Laws ch. 15, § 2 (current version FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24 (West
1985».
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FLORIDA

Until 1981, Florida, by statute, permitted an inmate mother
to keep 4er child within the institution. lo9 As early as 1957, section 944.24(2) of the Florida statutes permitted a woman who
gave birth to a child while incarcerated to retain custody of the
child in the institution until the child reached eighteen months
of age. 110
An incarcerated woman at Broward Correctional Institution
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida sought to enjoin the prison officials
from depriving her of custody of her newborn in Wainwright v.
Moore. l l l She claimed that she was pregnant and would be giving birth shortly.ll2 She sought to retain physical custody of the
child pursuant to section 944.24.113 The trial court interpreted
the statute as giving the expectant mother sole discretion in deciding whether or not to keep her child. 1l4 The appellate court
reversed, holding that the paramount consideration is the best
interests of the child. m The court held that since the statute
was silent as to who should make the decision regarding the
child's placement "[t]he rights of all interested parties; the
child, the mother, the prison officials, in an appropriate case the
father, and the State of Florida must be considered all in light of
the welfare of the child which remains the guiding principle."116
The court never actually said who was to make the final determination of whether or not the child may return to prison with
his or her mother.

Subsequently, ·in 1979, the Florida Legislature substantially
revised section 944.24 to provide for a hearing before a court
109. Id.
110. Section 944.24 (2) provided in pertinent part: "If any woman received by or
committed to said institution shall give birth to a child while an inmate of said institution, such child may be retained in the said institution until it reaches the age of 18
months . . . ." 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 121, § 22.
111. 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
112. Id. at 587.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The best interests of the child are generally the underlying concerns anytime placement of a child is questioned. The chIId's best interests are determined by
examining his or her physical, moral and spiritual well being. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 13
(1978).
116. Wainwright, 374 So. 2d at 588.
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judge to determine the best interests of the childll7 should the
mother elect to keep the infant in the institution. lls No longer
did the statute provide simply that an incarcerated woman may
retain custody of her child. Following this revision, an inmate at
Florida Correctional Institution at Lowell filed a petition for retention of physical custody of a child born to her during her incarceration. ll9 In Delancy v. Booth,120 the trial court found that
retention of custody by the incarcerated mother would not be in
the child's best interest. 121 This determination was upheld on
appeal/ 22 and the appellate court added, "The [mother] has no
constitutional or statutory right to raise the child in prison."123
In 1981, the Florida Legislature repealed the portions of
section 944.24 that allowed for a child to stay in prison with his
or her mother. The current statute provides simply that a woman shall give birth outside the institution and the child shall
be suitably placed outside the prison system. l24
117. Essentially, the welfare of a child born in a prison was within the jurisdiction of
the appropriate circuit court. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 331, § 1 (current version FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 944.24(2) (West 1981».
118. The revised statute provided:
If any woman received by or committed to said institution

shall give birth to a child while an inmate of said institution,
such child and its welfare shall be within the jurisdiction of
the appropriate circuit court if the mother chooses to keep the
infant. Upon petition by the Department of Correction, the
mother, or another interested party, a temporary custody
hearing before the circuit court judge without a jury shall be
held as soon as possible to determine the best interests of the
child. The department shall provide and maintain facilities or
parts of facilities, within the existing facilities, suitable to ensure the safety and welfare of such mothers and children, to
be used at the discretion of the court.
ld.

119. Delancy v. Booth, 400 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
120. ld.

121. ld. at 1269. The court heard testimony by a psychologist who said the prison
environment would not make any difference to the child. However, Booth, the Superintendent of the facility, testified the children had little stimulation in the facility. The
trial court found that the child should not remain in the prison environment. ld.
122. ld. at 1270.
123.ld.

124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24 (West 1985).
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YORK

New York has extremely progressive laws governing the
rights of incarcerated women to retain custody of their children. 125 Section 611(2) of the New York Correctional Law126 allows a child born to an incarcerated woman to be returned with
his or her mother to the correctional institution of her confinement, unless the mother is determined to be unfit by the chief
medical officer.127 The child may remain in the institution until
it reaches one year of age. 128 However, the officer in charge of
the institution may have a child removed at any time before it
reaches one year of age. 129
Although seemingly limited by this latter prOVISIOn, New
York courts have interpreted the entire section quite broadly. In
Apgar v. Beauter,l3O an inmate at Tioga County Jail sought to
enjoin the sheriff from prohibiting her from retaining custody
and care of her child while an inmate. l3l A New York supreme
court said, "[I]t is highly improbable that the Legislature intended to lodge in the person of a sheriff or prison warden an
unbridled power to negate without cause a long-standing bias in
this state in favor of a child remaining with its natural
mother."132 The court found that the welfare of the child was
125. New York has adopted a prison nursery system. A nursery is actually maintained on the grounds of the Bedford Hills facility. E. Barry & D. Lennon, supra note
102, at 1-2.
126. The statute provides in pertinent part:
A child so born may be returned with its mother to the correctional institution in which the mother is confined unless the
chief medical officer of the correctional institution shall certify
that the mother is physically unfit to care for the child, in
which case the statement of said medical officer shall be final.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611(2) (McKinney 1968).
127. ld.
128. Subsection (2) of section 611 continues: "A child may remain in the correctional institution with its mother for such period as seems desirable for the welfare of
such child, but not after it is one year of age." ld.
129. ld. "The officer in charge of such institution may cause a child cared for
therein with its mother to be removed from the institution at anytime before the child is
one year of age." ld.
130. 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 75 Misc.2d 439 (1973).
131. ld.
132. ld. at 875, 75 Misc.2d at 440. The court was responding to the sheriff's claim
that he had absolute discretion under section 611(2) to separate a mother and child. Ide
at 874-75, 75 Misc.2d at 439-40.
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best served -by remaining with his or her mother.133
The supreme court of Monroe County reached a different
conclusion six years later in Bailey v. Lombard. 134 Plaintiff, Ms.
Bailey, an inmate at Monroe County Jail and mother of five,
sought to retain physical custody of her newborn infant.135 In
reaching a decision, the court was able to distinguish the fact
situation here from that presented in Apgar. 13s Apgar, the court
said, involved a woman who was awaiting trial, and hence, "the
rights of the petitioning mother did not at the time of the decision conflict with the rights and welfare of the child. m37 Here,
Ms. Bailey was actually serving a sentence, which, the court
said, was "subject to uncertain termination."138 The court held
that the paramount consideration was the best interests of the
child,139 and in this case the needs of Ms. Bailey's child would be
better served outside the prison system.140 In reaching the decision, the court thoroughly examined Ms. Bailey's prior conduct
regarding her other children, and found that "she had never
functioned as a nurturing parent to any of them. "141 The court
concluded that since the mother was the wrongdoer, in this instance, her rights should be subservient to the interests of the
innocent child.142
The court in Bailey indicated that the decision of whether
or not a woman may keep her child in the institution of her confinement rests with the sheriff. 143 The sheriff's decision, however,
133. Id. at 875, 75 Misc.2d at 441. The court found that "incarceration in a jail or
correctional institution per se does not constitute such unfitness or exceptional circunIstances so as to require that a newborn infant be taken from its mother is attested to by
the enactment by the Legislature of Section 611(2) of the Correction Law." Id.
134. 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 101 Misc.2d 56 (1979).
135. Id. at 651, 101 Misc.2d at 57.
136. Id. at 653, 101 Misc.2d at 61.
137. Id. The court stated: "A factual distinction which makes a difference is the
conviction ..•." Id.
138.Id.
139.Id.
140. Id., 101 Misc.2d at 66
141. Id., 101 Misc.2d at 65. The court found that there had been a pattern of parent-child separation, and that when petitioner was asked some basic questions about her
children such as their favorite color or the name of their friends, she could not answer.
Id. at 655, 101 Misc.2d at 64.
142. Id. at 656; 101 Misc.2d at 65.
143. Id. at 654, 101 Misc.2d at 62. The court stated: "When the sheriff, under his
[her] statutory obligation, considers the best interests of the child .•.." Id. (emphasis
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must be based on a determination of the welfare of the child. l44
The court delineated certain guidelines to be followed in reaching a decision. For example, the sheriff should consider the facilities available, the offense for which the mother is serving her
sentence, the length of the sentence, and the parenting background of the mother.l4r; Section 611(2) is actually silent as to
who should make the decision concerning placement of the
child. The Apgar court indicated that priority would be given to
the mother's preference. The Bailey court, however, essentially
found that the sheriff was actually the decisionmaker, provided
his or her decision was not arbitrary.146 There have been no subsequent decisions.
C.

CALIFORNIA

Since 1929, California has allowed incarcerated women to
retain physical custody of their young children.147 The first statute in this area, Penal Code section 3401, promulgated in 1941,
permitted women to keep children under the age of two inside
the prison. 148
In 1978, Barbara Cardell, an inmate at the California Institution for Women (CIW) and mother of a newborn, filed a class
action to compel the implementation of section 3401.149 Ms.
added).
144.Id.
145. Id. The court stated:
The sheriff, in arriving at his [her] determination, should take
the following factors into consideration:
1. what would be the benefits to the child in staying with its
mother?
2. what would be the negative effects on the child?
3. what would be the benefits to the child in being placed in
foster care by the Department of Social Services?
4. what would be the negative effects of foster care on the
child?"
Id., 101 Misc. 2d at 62-63.
146. Id. at 653, 101 Misc. 2d at 62.
147. 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 248, § 9.
148. Section 3401 of the California Penal Code formerly provided: "If any woman
received by or committed to said institution have (sic) a child under two years of age, or
gives birth to a child while an inmate of said institution, such child may be admitted to,
and retained in, said institution until it reaches the age of two years . . . ." 1941 Cal.
Stat. ch. 53, § 1.
149. Cardell v. Enomoto, No. 701-094 (Sup. Ct. San Francisco, 1976).
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Cardell, while pregnant, informed CIW officials of her desire to
keep her child with her in prison after its birth.150 She requested
that they arrange for the child's stay.151 Receiving no action, Ms.
Cardell sought a writ of mandate. 152 She argued, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, that section 3401, "created
an absolute right in the mother to keep her baby with her while
she is incarcerated."153 The court held that since the statute said
"[s]uch child may be admitted to or retained in, said institution
. . . ,"154 it actually afforded prison officials the discretion to decide whether the mother may retain custody.155
In 1978, the California Legislature repealed section 3401.156
It was replaced with the Community Prisoner Mother-Infant
Care Program (MIC).157 The program enables qualified women
to serve part of their sentences in a "half-way" house 158 with
their children. 159 A woman who has children prior to incarceration, or who gives birth while in prison,160 will qualify for the
MIC program if she has a probable release date and maximum
sentence of six years. 161 If she had the child before entering
prison/ 62 she must have been the child's primary caretaker/ 63
and she must not have been found an unfit parent in any court
proceeding. 164
Implementation of the MIC program has been slow, largely
because the prison authorities claim that it is too costly.165 Due
150. Petition for Writ of Mandate, Temporary Restraining Order at 4, Cardell.
151. [d.
152. [d. at 1.
153. Memorandum of Intended Decision at 2, Cardell.
154. 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1054, § 2 (emphasis added).
155. Memorandum of Intended Decision at 2, Cardell.
156. 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1054, § 3.
157. [d. § 2 (current version CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3425. (West 1982» provides:
"The Legislature finds that the separation of infants from their mothers, while their
mothers are in prison, can cause serious psychological damage to such infants. To alleviate the harm to such infants, consistent with the interests of public safety and justice,
the following pilot program is enacted." [d.
158. A half-way house is a less restrictive facility designed to house those eligible for
partticipation in the program.
159. Aug. Interview, supra note 13.
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3419 (West 1982).
161. [d. § 3417(a).
162. [d. § 3417.
163. [d. § 3417(b).
164. [d. § 3417(c).
165. Jan. Interview, supra note 88. Ms. Barry said that following the promulgation
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to tremendous overcrowding at the women's prisons, it is now
more cost effective to house women at the prison facility.166 To
challenge the inadequate implementation of the MIC program, a
taxpayer,167 and pregnant women and mothers in the custody of
the California Department of Corrections filed an action. 16s The
complaint, in Rios v. McCarthy/69 alleged that defendants'170
failure to implement the program in a "fair and reasonable manner" violated the incarcerated mother's statutory and constitutional rights. l7l It alleged defendants failed to notify the eligible
prisoners of the existence of the MIC program in violation of the
Penal Code sections 3415172 and 3418. 173 The plaintiffs further
alleged that defendants failed to provide them with applications
for admission into the MIC program,174 that defendants arbitrarily denied them admission to the program,175 and that deof the mother-infant care program, it was actually less costly to place eligible women
inmates in the community. Now, since the California Institution for Women (CIW) is so
overcrowded, it is more expensive to house the women outside the facility. Id.
166.Id.
167. Nancy Shaw is the taxpayer plaintiff who was allegedly injured by defendants'
failure to fully implement the MIC program. She alleged that defendants inappropriately
administered tax dollars by failing to implement the program. Complaint at 24, Rios v.
McCarthy, No. 330211 (Sup. Ct. Sacramento 1985).
168. Rios v. McCarthy, No. 330211 (Sup. Ct. Sacramento 1985).
169. Id.
170. Complaint at 1, Rios. Named as defendants are: Daniel McCarthy, Director of
the California Department of Corrections (CDC); N.A. Chaderjian, Secretary of the
Youth and Adult Correctional Authority (YACA); Edward Veit, Acting Deputy Director,
Parole and Community Services, CDC; Wayne Estelle, Acting Superintendent of the California Institution for Women (CIW); Robert Borg, Superintendent of the California Rehabilitation Center. Id.
171. Complaint at 2, Rios.
172. Id. at 8-9. California Penal Code section 3415 requires the probation department to notify eligible women of the existence of the MIC program. CAL. PENAL CODE §
3415 (West 1982).
173. Women who give birth while serving their sentence must be notified about the
MIC program. Id. § 3418.
174. Complaint at 9, Rios. The complaint alleges that defendants have an obligation,
pursuant to California Penal Code sections 3416, 3417, 3419 and 3420, to provide potentially eligible women with applications if they are requested. Defendants allegedly give
plaintiffs outdated applications or simply fail to give them any applications. Id. at 9-10.
175. Id. at 10. Examples of the allegedly arbitrary reasons for denying plaintiffs admission to the program include: (1) excluding women with more than one child from
eligibility even though the language of the statute reads "[i]nmates who have one or
more children ... ," CAL. PENAL CODE § 3411 (West 1982) (emphasis added), (2) excluding women who do not have birth certificates although the California Department of
Corrections Manual states that a birth certificate need not be produced, and (3) excluding women based on the nature of their conviction even though Penal Code section 3420
states that only certain crimes are to be considered as affecting the burden of producing
evidence. Complaint at 10-11, Rios (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3420 (West 1982».
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fendants simply failed to adequately fund existing facilities. 176
The superior court judge issued a temporary restraining order against defendants. 177 Defendants were ordered to immediately process the applications of the named plaintiffs. 17s Since
this decision, the parties have had one formal settlement conference. 179 They have not reached a final agreement. The apparent
success of Rios may result in a successful MIC program.

D.

ANALYSIS

Forced separation of a mother and child may have long
term consequences. A bond forms between a mother and her
child that results from biological dependence and parental response both during pregnancy and after birth. ISO A mother is
particularly sensitive to her child following the birth1S1 and
forced separation adversely affects the initial adaptation process
of a mother and her newborn. 1s2 Since the majority of incarcerated women plan to resume care of their children upon release,ls3 they should be provided with the opportunity to live
with their children during this crucial developmental period. 1s4
The MIC program1S11 adopted in California offers women the
opportunity to remain with their young children. Unlike the
prison nursery system adopted in New York/ s6 the children of
California prisoners actually live outside the institution. This
situation may eliminate some of the negative effects the prison
176. I d. at 13. Although hundreds of women are potentially eligible for admission to
the MIC program, there are only four facilities in operation and fewer than a dozen
mothers are actually placed in the houses. Id. at 8.
177. Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Rios.
178. Id. at 3.
179. Jan. Interview, supra note 88.
180. OSOTSKY & CONNORS, Mother-Infant Interaction: An Integrative View of A
Complex System, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 519 -(1979).
181. Richards, supra note 14, at 49.
182. Id. The author suggests that "early separation can have an effect on the initial
adaptation process of parents to their newborns and this in itself is enough reason for
those responsible for maternity and neonatal care to reduce separation to the barest
minimum." Id.
183. PREGNANCY IN PRISON, supra note 5, at 13. The study found that 97% of incarcerated mothers planned to resume care of their children upon release. Id.
184. See E. Barry & D. Lennon, supra note 102, at 7-10.
185. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
186. See supra note 125 for relevant discussion.
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environment may have on the children, such as minimal cognitive stimulation. Is7 In California, the children reside in a more
home-like setting and can spend long periods of time with their
mothers. Once fully implemented, the MIC program may prove
to be an effective method of keeping mother and child together
while minimizing the adverse effects of the prison environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an effort to avoid litigation, and insure healthy, successful pregnancies, prisons should adopt minimum, uniform standards governing the provision of health care to pregnant women.
Deficient care that results in delay or denial of medical care is
unconstitutional. Women in institutions who believe the care
they receive is inadequate may challenge the system by alleging
it evidences "deliberate indifference" to their medical needs.
Women must recognize the effectiveness of litigation as a means
to redress grievances.
Few states have statutes alldwing for significant contact between mother and child. Two states have adopted different systems. New York's prison nursery system, although allowing the
mother to stay with her child, may not be best for the mother
and child because the children actually live inside the institution. California's system is better able to insure that mother and
child stay together in an environment less restrictive than the
prison structure. Once fully implemented, this may prove to be
the better system.

Terri L. Schupak*

187. E. Barry & D. Lennon, supra note 102, at 24. The nursery at Bedford Hills in
New York keeps the children in small cubicles which contain little more than a crib. The
children are permitted few toys and hence receive little cognitive and sensory-motor
stimulation.ld. at 13.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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